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Abstract
We present volume analyses of Multiplicative Weights Updates (MWU) and Optimistic Multiplicative
Weights Updates (OMWU) in zero-sum as well as coordination games. Such analyses provide new insights
into these game dynamical systems, which seem hard to achieve via the classical techniques within Computer
Science and Machine Learning.
The first step is to examine these dynamics not in their original space (simplex of actions) but in a dual
space (aggregate payoff space of actions). The second step is to explore how the volume of a set of initial
conditions evolves over time when it is pushed forward according to the algorithm. This is reminiscent
of approaches in Evolutionary Game Theory where replicator dynamics, the continuous-time analogue of
MWU, is known to always preserve volume in all games. Interestingly, when we examine discrete-time
dynamics, both the choice of the game and the choice of the algorithm play a critical role. So whereas
MWU expands volume in zero-sum games and is thus Lyapunov chaotic, we show that OMWU contracts
volume, providing an alternative understanding for its known convergent behavior. However, we also prove
a no-free-lunch type of theorem, in the sense that when examining coordination games the roles are reversed:
OMWU expands volume exponentially fast, whereas MWU contracts.
Using these tools, we prove two novel, rather negative properties of MWU in zero-sum games:
1. Extremism: even in games with unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium, the system recurrently gets stuck
near pure-strategy profiles, despite them being clearly unstable from game theoretic perspective.
2. Unavoidability: given any set of good points (with your own interpretation of “good”), the system
cannot avoid bad points indefinitely.
Figure 1: Evolution of MWU (left) and OMWU (right) in Matching-Pennies game in the dual space. The
origin is the unique Nash equilibrium. In this 2-D system, volume is area. MWU: The initial set is the tiny
red square around the equilibrium. When the set is evolved via MWU, it rotates tornado-like and its area
increases. [8] OMWU: The initial set is the outermost red square. When the set is evolved via OMWU, it
shrinks toward the equilibrium and its area decreases.
1
1 Introduction
In recent years, fuelled by AI applications such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), there has a been
a strong push towards a more detailed understanding of the behavior of online learning dynamics in zero-sum
games and beyond. Even when focusing on the canonical case of bilinear zero-sum games, the emergent be-
havior depends critically on the choice of the training algorithms. Results can macroscopically be grouped
in three distinct categories: convergent, divergent and cyclic/recurrent. Specifically, most standard regret
minimizing dynamics and online optimization dynamics, such as Multiplicative Weights Updates (MWU) or
gradient descent [6], although their time average converges [12], their day-to-day behavior diverges away from
Nash equilibria [3, 7]. On the other hand, some game-theoretically inspired dynamics, such as Optimistic
Multiplicative Weights Updates (OMWU) converge [10, 9]. (Numerous other convergent heuristics have also
been recently analyzed, e.g. [18, 14, 15, 4, 1].) Finally, if we simplify learning into continuous-time ordinary
differential equations (ODEs), such as Replicator Dynamics, the continuous time analogue of MWU, the emer-
gent behavior becomes almost periodic (Poincare´ recurrence) [20, 19, 5]. This level of complex case-by-case
analysis just to understand bilinear zero-sum games seems daunting. Can we find a more principled approach
behind these results that is also applicable to more general games?
One candidate is volume analysis, a commonly used tool in the area of Dynamical Systems. Briefly speaking,
what it does is to consider a set of starting points with positive volume (Lebesgue measure), and analyze how
the volume changes as the set evolves forward in time. As we shall see, an advantage of volume analysis is its
general applicability, for it can be used to analyze not just ODEs but different discrete-time algorithms such
as MWU and OMWU in different types of games.
In Evolutionary Game Theory, volume analysis has been applied to continuous-time dynamical systems/ODEs
(see [16, Sections 11.3 and 13.5] and [21, Chapter 9]). Eshel and Akin [11] showed that RD in any multi-player
matrix game is volume preserving in the dual (aggregate payoff) space. This result is in fact a critical step in
the proof of Poincare´ recurrence in zero-sum games. Loosely speaking, if we think of the set of initial condi-
tions as our uncertainty about where is the starting point of the system, since uncertainty does not decrease
(convergence) or increase (divergence) we end up cycling in space.
Cheung and Piliouras [8] recently applied volume analysis to discrete-time numerical algorithms in a series of
games, including two-person zero-sum games, graphical constant-sum games, generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors
games and general 2 × 2 bimatrix games. Among other results, they showed that MWU in zero-sum games
is Lyapunov chaotic in the dual space. This is done by showing that the volume of any set is expanding
exponentially fast. Lyapunov chaos is one of the most classical notions in the area of Dynamical Systems that
captures instability and unpredictability. More precisely, it captures the following type of butterfly effect : when
the starting point of a dynamical system is slightly perturbed, the resulting trajectories and final outcomes
diverge quickly. Lyapunov chaos means that such system is very sensitive to round-off errors in computer
simulations; thus, the result of Cheung and Piliouras provides a rigorous mathematical explanation to the
numerical instability of MWU experiments.
Our Contributions, and Roadmap for This Paper. Our contributions can be summarized into two
categories, both stemming from volume analyses. First, besides the numerical instability and unpredictability
already mentioned, we discover two novel and negative properties of MWU in zero-sum games in this paper,
which are consequences of exponential volume expansion. We call them unavoidability and extremism. We
have given informal descriptions of these two properties in the abstract; we will give more details about them
below.
Second, we carry out volume analysis on OMWU and discover that its volume-change behavior is in stark
contrast with MWU. To understand why we should be interested in such an analysis, we first point out that
in the study of game dynamics, a primary target is to seek algorithms that behave well in as broad family
of games as possible. Recently, OMWU was shown to achieve stability in zero-sum games, despite its strong
similarity with MWU (which is chaotic in zero-sum games). It is natural to ask how these stability behaviors
generalize to other games. We provide a negative answer, by proving that OMWU is volume-expanding and
Lyapunov chaotic in coordination games; see Figure 2 for a summary of this no-free-lunch phenomena. We
show that the volume is exponentially decreasing for OMWU in zero-sum game, mirroring with the recent
stability results [9, 10] in the original (primal) space (simplex of actions) about these game dynamics. The
details are presented in Section 6.
As unavoidability and extremism are shown via volume expansion argument, it is easy to generalize and
show that these two properties also appear in OMWU in coordination games. On a technical note, the volume
analysis on OMWU is more involved than that on MWU. Along the process, we propose an ODE system which
is the continuous-time analogue of OMWU in games, and the volume analysis relies crucially on the fact that
discrete-time OMWU is an online Euler discretization of the ODE system; see Section 5 for details.
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Zero-sum Games Coordination Games
MWU + [8] − (Theorem 17)
OMWU − (Theorem 16) + (Theorem 12)
Figure 2: How volume changes in the dual space. “+” denotes exponential volume expansion, unavoidabil-
ity and extremism, while “−” denotes exponential volume contraction. See Figures 1 and 3 for graphical
illuminations.
In Section 2.4, we discuss how volume analyses can be carried out on learning algorithms that are gradual,
i.e. controlled by a step-size ǫ. We demonstrate that volume analyses can often be boiled down to analyzing a
polynomial of ǫ that arises from the expansion of the determinant of some Jacobian matrix. This convincingly
indicates that volume analyses can be readily applicable to a broad family of learning algorithms.
In the rest of this introduction, we discuss extremism and unavoidability with more details. Section 2
contains the necessary background for this work. All missing proofs can be found in the appendix.
Extremism (Section 4). The more formal statement of our extremism theorem (Theorem 9) is: given any
zero-sum game that satisfies mild regularity condition, there is a dense set of starting points from which MWU
will lead to a state where both players concentrate their game-plays on only one strategy. More precisely, let
x,y denote the mixed strategies of the two players. For any δ > 0, there is a dense set of starting points
(x0,y0), from which MWU with a suitably small step-size leads to (xt,yt) for some time t, where there exists
a strategy j of Player 1 with xtj ≥ 1− δ, and a strategy k of Player 2 with ytk ≥ 1− δ.
To understand how bizarre extremism is, consider the classical Rock-Paper-Scissors game, which is a zero-
sum game with a unique fully-mixed Nash equilibrium, where each strategy is chosen with equal probability 1/3.
The extremism theorem indicates that there exists a starting point arbitrarily close to the Nash equilibrium,
which will eventually lead to a situation where each player essentially sticks with one strategy for a long period
of time1. As no pure Nash equilibrium exists, the trajectory will recurrently approach and then escape such
extremal points infinitely often (Theorem 10), demonstrating that the dynamic is very unstable.
Unavoidability (Section 3). The extremism theorem is actually an indirect consequence of an unavoidability
theorem of MWU in zero-sum games. Unavoidability is a notion first introduced in a topic of (automatic) control
theory called “avoidance control” [17], which addresses the following type of problems: for dynamical/automatic
systems, analyze whether they can always avoid reaching certain bad states, e.g. collisions of robots/cars, or
places with severe weather conditions.
To explain unavoidability of MWU in general games, we need another notion of uncontrollability. Let U
be a region which is in the strict interior of the primal simplex, and let V be the correspondence set of U
in the dual space. Informally, we say a region U is uncontrollable if any subset of V is exponentially volume
expanding in the dual space. As the volume is expanding quickly, it is impossible for V to contain the evolved
set after a sufficiently long period of time, which, when converting back to the primal space, implies that the
dynamic escapes from U (Theorem 5). When U is thought as a set of good points and its complements are the
set of bad points, the above discussions can be summarized by a punchline:
When a good set is uncontrollable, the bad set is unavoidable.
Note that the above discussion concerns general games. When we narrow down to zero-sum games, the
results of Cheung and Piliouras [8] indicate that under mild regularity condition, any set U in the the strict
interior of the primal simplex is uncontrollable. Thus, for MWU in zero-sum game, you can have whatsoever
interpretation of “good”, but the corresponding bad set is unavoidable.
Some ideas behind the proof of unavoidability come from Cheung and Piliouras [8], who demonstrated
several negative properties of MWU in special games, including generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors games. Our
key contribution here is to formulate and prove the fully generalized statement about this property. In the
proof of the extremism theorem, the first step uses unavoidability to show that extremism appears for one
player. But to show that extremism appears for both players simultaneously, we need some substantially novel
arguments in the subsequent steps.
1When xtj < δ, it takes at least Ω
(
1
ǫ
ln 1
δ
)
time before xj can possibly resume a “normal” value, say above 1/20.
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2 Preliminary
2.1 Games
In this paper, we focus on two-person general normal-form games. The strategy set of Player i is Si. Let
n = |S1| and m = |S2|. We assume n,m ≥ 2 throughout this paper. Let A and B be two S1 × S2 matrices,
which represent the payoffs to Players 1 and 2 respectively. We assume all payoffs are bounded within the
interval [−1, 1]. Let ∆d :=
{
(z1, z2, · · · , zd) ∈ Rd
∣∣ ∑d
j=1 zj = 1, and ∀ j, zj ≥ 0
}
. We call ∆ := ∆n ×∆m
the primal simplex or primal space of the game, which contains the set of all mixed strategy profiles of the
two players. We use x ∈ ∆n and y ∈ ∆m to denote strategy vectors of Players 1 and 2 respectively. When a
zero-sum game is concerned, only the matrix A needs to be specified, as B = −A.
Definition 1. A zero-sum game (A,−A) is trivial if there exist real numbers a1, a2, · · · , an and b1, b2, · · · , bm
such that Ajk = aj + bk.
A trivial game is not interesting as each player has a clear dominant strategy; for Player 1 it is argmaxj∈S1 aj ,
while for Player 2 it is argmink∈S2 bk. Following [8], we measure the distance of a zero-sum game A from
triviality by
c(A) := min
a1,··· ,an∈R
b1,··· ,bm∈R

max
j∈S1
k∈S2
(Ajk − aj − bk) − min
j∈S1
k∈S2
(Ajk − aj − bk)

 . (1)
Observe that if A′ is a sub-matrix of A, then c(A′) ≤ c(A). If one of the two dimensions of A is one, then
c(A) = 0. By setting all aj , bk to zero, we have the trivial bound c(A) ≤ 2.
For a coordination game, i.e. a game with payoff matrices in the form of (A,A), we also measure its distance
from triviality using Equation (1).
2.2 MWU and OMWU Update Rules in Dual and Primal Spaces
As is well-known, MWU and OMWU can be implemented either in the primal space, or in a dual space.
The dual space is D := Rn × Rm, in which MWU with positive step size ǫ generates a sequence of updates
(p0,q0), (p1,q1), (p2,q2), · · · , where ptj − p0j is ǫ times the cumulative payoff to Player 1’s strategy j up to
time t, and qtk − q0k is ǫ times the cumulative payoff to Player 2’s strategy k up to time t. At each time step, a
point (pt,qt) ∈ D is converted to a point (xt,yt) = (x(pt),y(qt)) ∈ ∆ by the following rules:
xtj = xj(p
t) = exp(ptj)
/(∑
ℓ∈S1
exp(ptℓ)
)
and ytk = yk(q
t) = exp(qtk)
/(∑
ℓ∈S2
exp(qtℓ)
)
. (2)
For convenience, we let G denote the function that converts a dual point to a primal point, i.e. G(p,q) =
(x(p),y(q)).
For MWU in a general-sum game, the payoffs to Player 1’s all strategies in round (t + 1) can then be
represented by the vector A · y(qt), while the payoffs to Player 2’s all strategies in round (t + 1) can be
represented by the vector BT · x(pt). Accordingly, the MWU update rule in the dual space can be written as
pt+1 = pt + ǫ ·A · y(qt) and qt+1 = qt + ǫ ·BT · x(pt). (3)
The above update rule in the dual space is equivalent to the following MWU update rule in the primal space
with starting point G(p0,q0), which some readers might be more familiar with:
xt+1j =
xtj · exp(ǫ · [A · yt]j)∑
ℓ∈S1
xtℓ · exp(ǫ · [A · yt]ℓ)
and yt+1k =
ytk · exp(ǫ · [BT · xt]k)∑
ℓ∈S2
ytℓ · exp(ǫ · [BT · xt]ℓ)
. (4)
For OMWU in a general-sum game with step-size ǫ, its update rule in the dual space starts with (p0,q0) =
(p1,q1), and for t ≥ 1,
pt+1 = pt + ǫ · [2A · y(qt)−A · y(qt−1)] and qt+1 = qt + ǫ · [2BT · x(pt)−BT · x(pt−1)] , (5)
where x(pt),y(qt) are as defined in (2). The above update rule in the dual space has an equivalent update
rule in the primal space, which is the same as (4), except we replace A · yt there by 2A · yt −A · yt−1, and
replace BT · xt there by 2BT · xt −BT · xt−1.
Note that for the update rule (5), for t ≥ 2, we have pt − p0 = ǫ(∑t−2τ=1A · y(qτ ) + 2 ·A · y(qt−1)), which
can be viewed as ǫ times the cumulative payoff to strategy j from time 2 up to time t, but with a double weight
on the last-iterate payoff.
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2.3 Relationships between Primal and Dual Spaces
Here, we clarify some facts about primal and dual spaces and their relationships. Equation (2) provides a
conversion from a point in D to a point in the interior of the primal space, i.e., int(∆). It is not hard to see
that there exist multiple points in D which convert to the same point in int(∆). Precisely, by [8, Proposition
1], if (p,q), (p′,q′) ∈ D, then (x(p),y(q)) = (x(p′),y(q′)) if and only if p− p′ = c1 · 1 and q− q′ = c2 · 1 for
some c1, c2 ∈ R. For any S ⊂ int(∆), we let G−1(S) denote the set of points (p,q) in the dual space D such
that G(p,q) ∈ S.
Since the primal and dual spaces are not in one-one correspondence, some readers might argue that the
reduced dual space used by Eshel and Akin [11] (in which its (n+m− 2) dual variables denote the quantities
p1 − pn, p2 − pn, · · · , pn−1 − pn, q1 − qm, q2 − qm, · · · , qm−1 − qm) is a better choice. Our reason for choosing
D as the dual space to work with is simply because we are unable to establish the same type of results (like
Lemma 3 below) for the reduced dual space.
The following proposition shows that volume expansion in the dual space implies large diameter in the
primal space, if the corresponding primal set is bounded away from the simplex boundary.
Proposition 2. Let S be a set in the dual space with Lebesgue volume v. Suppose there exists j ∈ S1 and
k ∈ S2 such that max(p,q)∈S pj −min(p,q)∈S pj ≤ Rj and max(p,q)∈S qk −min(p,q)∈S qk ≤ Rk. Also, suppose
that for some κ > 0, there exists a point (x,y) ∈ G(S) such that either every entry of x is at least κ or every
entry of y is at least κ. Then the diameter of G(S) is at least
[
1− exp
(
− 14 ·
(
v
RjRk
)1/(n+m−2))]
· κ.
We point out that while we use volume as the mean for analyses, when measuring instability what we really
care is the diameter of the set S or its corresponding primal set. Indeed, volume is not an ideal benchmark, as
we present concrete examples in Appendix A to show that (A) volume contraction in the dual space does not
necessarily imply stability in either the dual or the primal space; (B) volume expansion in the dual space does
not necessarily imply instability in the primal space if the primal set is near the simplex boundary. We show
that (B) remains true in the reduced dual space.
2.4 Dynamical System, Jacobian, and Volume of Flow
A dynamical system is typically described by a system of ordinary differential equations (ODE) over time in
R
d, governed by d differential equations on the variables s1, s2, · · · , sd, which are of the form ∀j ∈ [d], dsjdt =
Fj(s1, s2, · · · , sd). Given a starting point (s◦1, s◦2, · · · , s◦d), the values of the variables at any time t ≥ 0 are
typically uniquely determined; precisely, given the starting point, for each j ∈ [d], there is a function sj : R+ →
R such that altogether they satisfy the ODE system, with (s1(0), s2(0), · · · , sd(0)) being the given starting
point. The collection of the functions s1, s2, · · · , sd is called the trajectory of the given starting point. The
flow of a given starting point at time t is simply (s1(t), s2(t), · · · , sd(t)). In this paper, we assume that Fj is
smooth everywhere.
Given a measurable set S and an ODE system, the flow of S at time t is simply the collection of the flows
of all starting points in S at time t; when the underlying ODE system is clear from context, we denote it by
S(t). Let vol(S) denote the Lebesgue volume of set S.
The Jacobian of the ODE system at s = (s1, s2, · · · , sd) is the d× d-matrix J(s):
J(s) =


∂
∂s1
F1(s)
∂
∂s2
F1(s) · · · ∂∂sdF1(s)
...
...
. . .
...
∂
∂s1
Fd(s)
∂
∂s2
Fd(s) · · · ∂∂sdFd(s)

 . (6)
The Liouville’s theorem states that if S(0) ⊂ Rd is a bounded and measurable set, then
d
dt
vol(S(t)) =
∫
s∈S
trace(J(s)) dV. (7)
The Liouville’s theorem is indeed the continuous analogue of integration by substitution for multi-variables,
which applies for calculating volume changes of discrete-time update rules. We present a simplified version of
it which suffices for our purposes. For a gradual update rule
st+1 = st + ǫ · F (st),
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where F : Rd → Rd is a smooth function and step-size ǫ > 0, if S ⊂ Rd is a bounded and measurable set, and
if the discrete flow in one time step maps S to S′ injectively, then
vol(S′) =
∫
s∈S
det (I+ ǫ · J(s)) dV, (8)
where J(s) is as defined in (6), and I is the identity matrix.
Clearly, analyzing the determinant in the integrand is crucial in volume analysis; we call it the volume
integrand in this paper. When the determinant is expanded using the Leibniz formula, it becomes a polynomial
of ǫ, in the form of 1 + C(s) · ǫh +O(ǫh+1) for some integer h ≥ 1. Thus, when ǫ is sufficiently small, the sign
of C(s) dictates on whether the volume expands or contracts.
In our case, s refers to a cumulative payoff vector (p,q). Cheung and Piliouras [8] showed that for the
MWU update rule (3) in the dual space, the volume integrand can be written as 1 +C(A,B)(p,q) · ǫ2 +O(ǫ4),
where
C(A,B)(p,q) = −
∑
j∈S1
∑
k∈S2
xj(p) · yk(q) · (Ajk − [A · y(q)]j) · (Bjk − [BT · x(p)]k). (9)
Note that C(A,B)(p,q) depends on the primal variables x(p),y(q) but not explicitly on p,q. Thus, it is
legitimate to refer to this value using the primal variables as input parameters to C(A,B), i.e., we can refer to
its value by C(A,B)(x,y) too. Cheung and Piliouras [8] showed the following lemma.
Lemma 3. [8, Lemma 3, Section 4.1 and Appendix B] The following hold:
1. When ǫ ≤ 1/4, the update rule (3) in the dual space is injective.
2. In any two-person zero-sum game (A,−A), at any point (x,y) ∈ ∆, C(A,−A)(x,y) ≥ 0. Indeed,
C(A,−A)(x,y) equals to the variance of the random variable X such that X = (Ajk − [Ay]j − [ATx]k)
with probability xjyk, for all (j, k) ∈ S1 × S2.
3. When ǫ < min
{
1/(32n2m2), C(p,q)
}
, the volume integrand at point (p,q) is lower bounded by 1 +
(C(A,B)(p,q) − ǫ)ǫ2. Thus, in (8), if C := min(p,q)∈S CA,B(p,q) > 0, then for all 0 < ǫ ≤ C,
vol(S′) ≥ [1 + (C − ǫ) ǫ2] · vol(S).
By the definition of C(A,B), it is straight-forward to see that
C(A,A)(p,q) = − C(A,−A)(p,q). (10)
Thus, for any coordination game (A,A), and for any (p,q) ∈ D, C(A,A)(p,q) ≤ 0 due to Lemma 3 Part (2).
2.5 Lyapunov Chaos
In the study of dynamical systems, Lyapunov chaos generally refers to following phenomenon in some systems:
a tiny difference in the starting points can yield widely diverging outcomes quickly. A classical measure of
chaos is Lyapunov time, defined as: when the starting point is perturbed by a distance of tiny γ, for how long
will the trajectories of the two starting points remain within a distance of at most 2γ. Cheung and Piliouras [8]
showed that if the volume of a set increases at a rate of Ω((1 + β)t), its diameter increases at a rate of at
least Ω((1+ β/d)t), where d is the dimension of the system, thus indicating that the Lyapunov time is at most
O(d/β).
3 Unavoidability of MWU in Games
The result in this section holds for MWU in general-sum games. Recall the definition of C(A,B)(p,q) in Equa-
tion (9), and the discussion on extending the definition of the function C to the primal space (i.e. C(A,B)(x,y))
below Equation (9). To avoid cluster, when the underlying game (A,B) is clear from context, we write C(·)
for C(A,B)(·).
Definition 4. A set U ⊂ int(∆) is called a primal open set if there is an open set U ′ in Rn+m, such that
U = U ′ ∩∆. A primal open set U is uncontrollable if inf(x,y)∈U C(x,y) > 0.
The following is the unavoidability theorem, the main theorem in this section.
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Theorem 5. Let U be an uncontrollable primal open set with inf(x,y)∈U C(x,y) ≥ C > 0. If the step-size ǫ in
the update rule (4) satisfies ǫ < min
{
1
32n2m2 , C
}
, then there exists a dense subset of points in U such that the
flow of each such point must eventually reach a point outside U .
Recall that one perspective to think about the unavoidability theorem is to consider U as a collection of
good points, while ∆ \ U is the set of bad points that we want to avoid. We desire the game dynamic to stay
within U forever, so long as the starting point is in U . The theorem then presents a negative property, which
states that if U is uncontrollable, then there is a dense set of points in U such that the game dynamic must
eventually reach a point that we want to avoid.
In particular, when the underlying game is a zero-sum game, due to Lemma 3, inf(x,y)∈U C(x,y) ≥ 0 for
any U . With some mild assumptions on U and the underlying game, it is foreseeable that the infimum will
become strictly positive, for which Theorem 5 is applicable. For instance, if the zero-sum game is not trivial
(see Definition 1), and U collects all primal points (x,y) such that all xj , yk ≥ δ for some fixed δ > 0, then the
infimum is strictly positive due to Lemma 3 Part (2); see [8] for a detailed explanation. Informally speaking,
for quite general scenarios, MWU in zero-sum game cannot avoid bad states, regardless of what “good” or
“bad” really mean.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 5
In Definition 4, we have defined uncontrollability of a set in the primal space. In the dual space, the definition
of uncontrollability is similar: an open set V in the dual space is uncontrollable if inf(p,q)∈V C(p,q) > 0.
The following is the key lemma to proving Theorem 5.
Lemma 6. Let V be an uncontrollable open set in the dual space, with inf(p,q)∈V C(p,q) ≥ C > 0. Assume
that the step-size ǫ in the update rule (3) satisfies 0 < ǫ < min
{
1
32n2m2 , C
}
. Let S ⊂ V be a measurable set
with positive volume, and let S(t) be the flow of S at time t. Also, let
d(S) := max
{
max
j∈S1
{
max
(p,q)∈S
pj − min
(p,q)∈S
pj
}
, max
k∈S2
{
max
(p,q)∈S
qk − min
(p,q)∈S
qk
}}
.
Then there exists a time τ with
τ ≤ max
{
d(S)
2ǫ
,
8(n+m)
(C − ǫ)ǫ2 ln
4(n+m)
(C − ǫ)ǫ2 ,
4
(C − ǫ)ǫ2 ln
1
vol(S)
}
, (11)
such that S(τ) contains a point which is not in V .
Proof: We suppose the contrary, i.e., for all τ ≤ T , S(τ) ⊂ V , where T will be specified later. We analyze
how the volume of S(t) changes with t using formula (8). We rewrite it here:
vol(S(t+ 1)) =
∫
(p,q)∈S(t)
det (I+ ǫ · J(p,q)) dV.
By Lemma 3, if S(t) ⊂ V , then the above inequality yields vol(S(t + 1)) ≥ vol(S(t)) · (1 + (C − ǫ)ǫ2), and
hence
∀t ≤ T + 1, vol(S(t)) ≥ vol(S) · (1 + (C − ǫ)ǫ2)t . (12)
On the other hand, observe that in the update rule (3), each variable is changed by a value in the interval
[−ǫ, ǫ] per time step, since every entry in A,B is in the interval [−1, 1]. Consequently, the range of possible
values for each variable in S(t) lies within an interval of length at most d(S) + 2ǫt, and hence S(t) is a subset
of a hypercube with side length d(S) + 2ǫt. Therefore,
∀t ≤ T + 1, vol(S(t)) ≤ (d(S) + 2ǫt)n+m . (13)
Note that the lower bound in (12) is exponential in t, while the upper bound in (13) is polynomial in
t. Intuitively, it is clear that the two bounds cannot be compatible for some large enough T , and hence a
contradiction. The rest of this proof is to derive how large T should be. Precisely, we seek T such that
(d(S) + 2ǫT )
n+m
< vol(S) · (1 + (C − ǫ)ǫ2)T .
First, we impose that T ≥ d(S)/(2ǫ) =: T1. Taking logarithm on both sides, to satisfy the above inequality, it
suffices that
(n+m) ln(4ǫT ) <
T · (C − ǫ)ǫ2
2
+ ln(vol(S)).
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Since 4ǫ ≤ 1, it suffices that
(C − ǫ)ǫ2T − 2(n+m) lnT > 2 · ln 1
vol(S)
.
Next, observe that when T ≥ 8(n+m)
(C−ǫ)ǫ2
ln 4(n+m)
(C−ǫ)ǫ2
=: T2, we have (C − ǫ)ǫ2T − 2(n+m) lnT ≥ (C − ǫ)ǫ2T/2.
(We will explain why in the next paragraph.) Then it is easy to see that T ≥ 4
(C−ǫ)ǫ2
ln 1
vol(S) =: T3 suffices.
Overall, we need T = max{T1, T2, T3}.
Lastly, we explain why the inequality in the last paragraph holds. Observe that it is equivalent to TlnT ≥
4(n+m)
(C−ǫ)ǫ2
=: γ. Then it suffices to know that TlnT is an increasing function of T when T ≥ 3, and
T2
lnT2
=
2γ ln γ
ln 2 + ln γ + ln ln γ
≥ 2γ ln γ
2 ln γ
= γ,
where the only inequality sign in the above expression holds because ln γ ≥ ln ln γ + ln 2 > 0 when γ ≥ 3.
The following proposition is straight-forward.
Proposition 7. If U is a primal open set, then G−1(U) is an open and unbounded subset in D.
Proof of Theorem 5: Let U ′ denote the set of points in U which, when taken as a starting point, will
eventually reach a point outside U . Suppose the theorem does not hold, i.e., U ′ is not dense. Then we can find
a primal open set B ⊂ U such that its flow must stay in U forever.
Let V := G−1(U) and S′ := G−1(B). Due to the discussion immediately after Equation (9) and the
assumption that U is uncontrollable in the primal space, V is uncontrollable in the dual space. On the other
hand, S′ is open and unbounded due to Proposition 7. But it is easy to find a subset S ⊂ S′ which is open
and bounded. Thus, S has positive and finite volume. We apply Lemma 6 with the sets V, S given above, to
show that using update rule (3), the flow of S at some time τ contains a point (pτ ,qτ ) /∈ V . By definition of
V , G(pτ ,qτ ) /∈ U .
Let (p0,q0) denote a point in S such that its flow at time τ is (pτ ,qτ ). Since S is a subset of S′,
G(p0,q0) ∈ B. Due to the equivalence between the primal update rule (4) and the dual update rule (3), we
can conclude that when G(p0,q0) ∈ B is used as the starting point of the primal update rule (4), at time τ its
flow is G(pτ ,qτ ) which is not in U , a contradiction.
4 Extremism of MWU in Zero-Sum Games
Here, we focus on MWU in zero-sum game. [3] and [7] showed that the dynamic converges to the boundary of
∆ and fluctuates bizarrely near the boundary by using a potential function argument. However, the potential
function has value +∞ at every point on the boundary so it cannot be distinctive there, and hence it cannot
provide any useful insight on how the dynamic behaves near the boundary. In general, the behaviors near
boundary can be highly unpredictable, as suggested by the “chaotic switching” phenomenon found by [2],
although more regular (yet still surprising) patterns were found in lower-dimensional systems [13].
In [3, 7], a central discouraging message is convergence towards boundary of ∆ is inevitable even when the
underlying zero-sum game has a fully-mixed Nash equilibrium. What can we still hope for after this? Will
(xt,yt) remain within a somewhat reasonable range around the Nash equilibrium forever? We answer the latter
question with a strikingly general negative answer for almost all zero-sum games, with the two theorems below.
Definition 8. The extremal domain with threshold δ consists of all points (x,y) such that each of x,y has
exactly one entry of value at least 1− δ.
Theorem 9. Let (A,−A) be a two-person zero-sum game. Suppose the following:
(A) Every 2 × 2 sub-matrix of A is non-trivial. Let α1 > 0 denote the minimum distance from triviality of
all 2× 2 sub-matrices of A. (Recall the distance measure (1).)
(B) No two entries in the same row or the same column have exactly the same value. Let α2 > 0 be the
minimum difference between any two entries of A in the same row or the same column.
Let N := max{n,m}. For any 0 < δ < α2/4, if both players use MWU with step-size ǫ satisfying 0 < ǫ <
min
{
1
32n2m2 ,
(α1)
2
18 ·
(
δ
N−1
)8(N−1)/(α2−4δ)+2}
, then there exists a dense subset of points in int(∆), such that
the flow of each such point must eventually reach the extremal domain with threshold δ.
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Theorem 10. Let v denote the game value of the zero-sum game (A,−A). In addition to the conditions
required in Theorem 9, if (i) minj∈S1,k∈S2 |Ajk − v| ≥ r > 0, and (ii) 6ǫ + 4δ ≤ r, then there exists a dense
subset of points in int(∆), such that the flow of each such point visits and leaves extremal domain with threshold
δ infinitely often.
To see the power of the Theorem 9, consider a zero-sum game with a fully-mixed Nash Equilibrium. The
theorem implies that in any arbitrarily small open neighbourhood of the Nash equilibrium, there exists a starting
point such that its flow will eventually reach a point where each player concentrates her game-play on only
one strategy. We call this extremism of game-play, since both players are single-minded at this point: they are
concentrating on one strategy and essentially ignoring all the other available options.
There are two assumptions on the matrix A. If the matrix is to be drawn uniformly randomly from the
space [−1,+1]n×m, the random matrix satisfies assumptions (A) and (B) almost surely. Unfortunately, the
classical Rock-Paper-Scissors game is a zero-sum game which does not satisfy assumption (A) in Theorem 9,
and thus the theorem is not applicable. In Appendix B.1, we provide a separate proof which shows similar
result to Theorem 9 for this specific game.
4.1 Proof Sketch of Theorem 9
The full proofs of the two theorems are deferred to Appendix B. Here, we give high-level description of the
proof of Theorem 9.
We first define a family of primal open sets in int(∆). Let Eδa,b be the collection of all points (x,y), such
that at least a entries in x are larger than δ, and at least b entries in y are larger than δ. The first step is to
use condition (A) to show that for any 1/3 > κ > 0,
Eκ2,2 is an uncontrollable primal set with inf
(x,y)∈Eκ2,2
C(x,y) ≥ κ2(α1)2/2. (14)
Then we can apply Theorem 5 to show that for any sufficiently small step-size ǫ, there exists a dense subset
of points in Eκ2,2 such that the flow of each such point must eventually reach a point outside Eκ2,2. Let (xˆ, yˆ)
denote the reached point outside Eκ2,2. At (xˆ, yˆ), one of the two players, which we assume to be Player 1 without
loss of generality, concentrates her game-play on only one strategy, which we denote by strategy jˆ. We have:
for any j 6= jˆ, xˆj ≤ κ, and hence
∑
j∈S1\{jˆ}
xˆj ≤ (N − 1)κ.
When we pick (N − 1)κ ≪ δ, where δ is the quantity specified in Theorem 9, after the dynamic reaches
(xˆ, yˆ), the total probability of choosing any strategy other than jˆ by Player 1 will be at most δ for a long period
of time — this is true because that total probability can increase by a factor of at most exp(2ǫ) per time step.
In other words, we may think that the game essentially becomes an 1 ×m sub-game of (A,−A) during this
long period of time.
We then show that during the long period of time, no matter what yˆ is, the game-play of Player 2 must
become concentrating on one strategy too. Naively, one might think that this strategy ought to be k which
maximizes −Ajˆk, which is the dominant strategy of Player 2 in the 1 ×m sub-game. However, if yˆk is tiny,
this might not be true. To reach the conclusion, we have to use a technical lemma, Lemma 14 in Appendix B.
5 Continuous Analogue of OMWU
As the update rule (5) at time t + 1 depends on the past updates at times t and t − 1, at first sight it might
seem necessary to perform volume analysis in the product space ∆ ×∆ that contains ((pt,qt), (pt−1,qt−1)).
However, this raises a number of technical difficulties. First, since the initialization sets (p1,q1) as a function of
(p0,q0), the initial set has to lie in a proper manifold in ∆×∆, thus it has zero Lebesgue measure w.r.t. ∆×∆,
making volume analysis useless, as the volume must remain zero when the initial set is of measure zero. Second,
even if we permit p1,q1 to be unrelated to p0,q0 so that we can permit an initial set with positive measure,
the OMWU update rule is not of the same type that is presumed by the formula (8). We will need to use
the more general form of integration by substitution, and the volume integrand there will not be of the form
I + ǫ · J, hence the determinant is not a polynomial of ǫ with constant term 1. This imposes huge difficulty
in analysis, forbidding us to present a clean volume analysis as was done in [8]. To bypass the issues, we first
derive a continuous analogue of OMWU in games as an ODE system, which will permit us to have a clean
volume analysis.
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5.1 Continuous Analogue of OMWU in General Contexts
We focus on Player 1 who uses the OMWU update rule (5) in the dual space. To set up for the most general
context, we replace A ·y(qt) by u(t), which represents the utility (or payoff) vector at time t. We assume u(t)
is C2-differentiable. We rewrite the rule as below:
pt+1 − pt
ǫ
= u(t) + ǫ · u(t)− u(t− 1)
ǫ
. (15)
Recall that for any smooth function f : R → R, its first derivative is limǫ→0(f(x + ǫ) − f(x))/ǫ. For readers
familiar with Euler discretization and finite-difference methods, the above discrete-time rule naturally motivates
the following differential equation, where for any variable v, v˙ ≡ dv
dt :
p˙ = u + ǫ · u˙. (16)
To numerically simulate (16), we should take into account various informational constraints:
• If the function u is explicitly given and it is a simple function of time (e.g. a polynomial), the function u˙
can be explicitly computed. Euler method with step-size ∆t = ǫ is the update rule p(t + ǫ) = p(t) + ǫ ·
u(t) + ǫ2 · u˙(t).
• However, in some scenarios, u is a rather complicated function of t, so computing explicit formula for u˙
might not be easy. Yet, we have full knowledge of values of u(0),u(∆t),u(2 · ∆t),u(3 · ∆t), · · · . Then
a common approach to approximately compute u˙(N · ∆t) is to use the central finite-difference method:
u˙(N ·∆t) = u((N+1)·∆t)−u((N−1)·∆t)2·∆t + O((∆t)2). Euler method with step-size ∆t = ǫ which makes use
of the above approximation gives the update rule p(t+ ǫ) = p(t) + ǫ · u(t) + ǫ · u(t+ǫ)−u(t−ǫ)2 .
• Even worse, in the context of online learning or game dynamics, at time N · ∆t, the players have only
observed u(0),u(∆t),u(2 ·∆t), · · · ,u(N ·∆t), but they do not have any knowledge on the future values of
u. Due to the more severe constraint on information, we have to settle with the backward finite-difference
method to approximately compute u˙(N · ∆t): u˙(N · ∆t) = u(N ·∆t)−u((N−1)·∆t)∆t + O(∆t), which has a
higher-order error when compared with the central finite-difference method. Euler method with step-size
∆t = ǫ which makes use of the above approximation gives the rule (15), by identifying p(t + ǫ) as pt+1.
Due to an error that occurs when we approximate u˙ as above,
ǫ · u(t) + ǫ · (u(t)− u(t− 1)) = ǫ [u(t) + ǫ · u˙(t)] +O(ǫ3), (17)
where the LHS is the quantity pt+1 − pt in the OMWU update rule (15), and the first term in the RHS is
the standard Euler discretization of (16).
Proposition 11. From differential equation (16), when only online value oracle for a C2-differentiable function
u is given, the discrete-time update rule (5) is obtained by first using backward finite-difference method with step-
size ǫ to approximate u˙, and then applying the Euler discretization method with step-size ǫ. Also, Equation (17)
holds.
While we heuristically derived the ODE system (16) from OMWU with ǫ being the step-size, but after it is
derived, ǫ becomes a parameter of a parametrized family of learning dynamics. When this parameter ǫ is zero,
system (16) recovers the Replicator Dynamics. When ǫ > 0, it reduces the increment of pj if u˙j is negative.
It can be interpreted as a common learning behavior (e.g. in financial markets), which is mainly depending on
the payoffs, but also having a tuning which depends on the trend of payoffs. There is nothing to stop us from
having a negative ǫ, although it is not clear in what contexts such learning dynamics are motivated.
5.2 Continuous Analogue of OMWU in General-Sum Games
Next, we use (16) to derive a system of differential equations for OMWU in general-sum games. In these and
also many other learning contexts, u, u˙ depend on the driving variables p,q. In (16), for Player 1, we replace
u(t) by A · y(qt). By the chain rule,
dpj
dt
= [A · y(q)]j + ǫ · d[A · y(q)]j
dt
= [A · y(q)]j + ǫ ·
∑
k∈S2
∂[A · y(q)]j
∂qk
· dqk
dt
.
10
Recall from [8, Equation (7)] that
∂[A·y(q)]j
∂qk
= yk(q) · (Ajk − [A · y(q)]j). Thus,
dpj
dt
= [A · y(q)]j + ǫ
∑
k∈S2
yk(q) · (Ajk − [A · y(q)]j) · dqk
dt
. (18)
Analogously,
dqk
dt
= [BT · x(p)]k + ǫ
∑
j∈S1
xj(p) · (Bjk − [BT · x(p)]k) · dpj
dt
. (19)
Formally, the above two formulae, which are in a recurrence format, have not yet formed an ODE system.
To settle this issue, in Appendix C, we show that when ǫ is small enough, they can be reduced to a standard
ODE system of the form (
dp
dt
,
dq
dt
)T
= [I− ǫM(p,q)]−1 · v(p,q)
for some matrixM(p,q) and vector v(p,q). This then formally permits us to use (18) and (19) in the analysis
below, as is standard in formal power series when dealing with generating functions.
6 Volume Analysis of OMWU in Games
Iterating the recurrence (18) and (19) yields the following system.
dpj
dt
= [A · y(q)]j + ǫ
∑
k∈S2
yk(q) · (Ajk − [A · y(q)]j) · [BT · x(p)]k + O(ǫ2);
dqk
dt
= [BT · x(p)]k + ǫ
∑
j∈S1
xj(p) · (Bjk − [BT · x(p)]k) · [A · y(q)]j + O(ǫ2). (20)
Proposition 11 establishes that in general contexts, (5) is the online Euler discretization of the differential
equation (16). As a special case in games, (5) is the online Euler discretization of the recurrence system (18)
and (19). Via Equations (20) and (17), we rewrite (5) as
pt+1j = p
t
j + ǫ[A · y(qt)]j + ǫ2
∑
k∈S2
yk(q
t) · (Ajk − [A · y(qt)]j) · [BT · x(pt)]k +O(ǫ3);
qt+1k = q
t
k + ǫ[B
T · x(pt)]k + ǫ2
∑
j∈S1
xj(p
t) · (Bjk − [BT · x(pt)]k) · [A · y(qt)]j +O(ǫ3).
Update rule (5) can be implemented easily by the players in distributed manner, but it is hard to be used
for volume analysis. The above update rule cannot be implemented by the players in distributed manner,
since Player 1 does not know the values of yk and [B
T · x(p)]k. However, it will permit us to perform a clean
volume analysis, since its RHS involves only pt,qt but not pt−1,qt−1. We will show that when we ignore the
O(ǫ3) terms and perform volume analysis as described in Section 2.4, the volume integrand is of the format
1 + C′ǫ2 + O(ǫ3). Thus, taking the ignored terms into account does not affect the crucial C′ǫ2 term which
dictates volume change.
For the moment, we ignore the O(ǫ3) terms. To use (8) for computing volume change, we need to derive
ǫ · J(p,q) in the volume integrand:
∀j1, j2 ∈ S1, ǫJj1j2 = ǫ2
∑
k∈S2
yk(q) · (Aj1k − [A · y(q)]j1 ) · xj2 (p) · (Bj2k − [BT · x(p)]k) ;
∀k1, k2 ∈ S2, ǫJk1k2 = ǫ2
∑
j∈S1
xj(p) · (Bjk1 − [BT · x(p)]k1 ) · yk2(q) · (Ajk2 − [A · y(q)]j) ;
∀j ∈ S1, k ∈ S2, ǫJjk = ǫ · yk(q) · (Ajk − [A · y(q)]j) + O(ǫ2) ;
∀k ∈ S2, j ∈ S1, ǫJkj = ǫ · xj(p) · (Bjk − [BT · x(p)]k) + O(ǫ2) .
With the above formulae, we expand det(I + ǫ · J(p,q)) via the Leibniz formula. The determinant is of the
form 1 + C′(p,q) · ǫ2 +O(ǫ3), where C′(p,q) is the coefficient of ǫ2 in the expression∑
j∈S1
ǫJjj +
∑
k∈S2
ǫJkk −
∑
j∈S1
k∈S2
(ǫJjk)(ǫJkj).
A straight-forward arithmetic shows the above expression equals to −ǫ2 · C(A,B)(p,q) +O(ǫ3), and hence
det(I+ ǫ · J(p,q)) = 1 − C(A,B)(p,q) · ǫ2 + O(ǫ3). (21)
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6.1 OMWU in Coordination Games is Lyapunov Chaotic in the Dual Space
At this point, it is important to address the similarity of MWU in zero-sum games (A,−A) and OMWU in
coordination games (A,A). Recall from [8] that the volume integrand for the former case is
1 + C(A,−A)(p,q) · ǫ2 +O(ǫ4),
while by (21) and (10), the volume integrand for the latter case is
1− C(A,A)(p,q) · ǫ2 +O(ǫ3) = 1 + C(A,−A)(p,q) · ǫ2 +O(ǫ3).
When ǫ is the sufficiently small, their volume-change behaviors are almost identical. Using (14), we can deduce
all the Lyapunov chaos, unavoidability and extremism results in Section 3 for OMWU in coordination games.
We also have volume contraction results for OMWU in zero-sum game and MWU in coordination game, which
are stated formally in Theorems 16 and 17 in Appendix D.
Theorem 12. Suppose the underlying game is a non-trivial coordination game (A,A) and the parameter
α1 as defined in Theorem 9 is strictly positive. For any 1/2 > δ > 0, for any sufficiently small 0 < ǫ ≤
ǫ¯ where the upper bound depends on δ, and for any set S = S(0) ⊂ G−1(Eδ2,2) in the dual space, if S is
evolved by the OMWU update rule (5) and if its flow remains a subset of G−1(Eδ2,2) for all t ≤ T − 1, then
vol(S(T )) ≥
(
1 + ǫ
2δ2(α1)
2
4
)T
· vol(S). Consequently, the system is Lyapunov chaotic within G−1(Eδ2,2) of the
dual space, with Lyapunov time O((n+m)/(ǫ2δ2(α1)2)).
6.2 Negative Consequences of Volume Expansion of OMWU in Coordination
Game
In Sections 3 and 4, the unavoidability and extremism theorems are proved largely due to volume expansion;
For the extremism theorems, it requires some additional arguments that seem specific to MWU, which comprise
of Lemma 14 and Step 3 in the proof of Theorem 9, both in Appendix B). But a careful examination of the
proof of Lemma 14 and the Step 3 finds these additional arguments work for OMWU too (with very minor
modifications). Thus, the unavoidability and extremism theorems hold for OMWU too, after suitably modifying
the condition needed for volume expansion, and the upper bounds on the step-sizes.
Suppose a coordination game has a non-pure Nash equilibrium (i.e. a Nash equilibrium (x∗,y∗) in which
the supports of x∗,y∗ are both of size at least 2). By Theorem 9 (the OMWU analogue), for any tiny open
ball B around the equilibrium, there is a dense subset of points in int(∆) ∩ B such that the flow of this
point eventually reaches close to an extremal point. In other words, there are points arbitrarily close to the
equilibrium with their flows reaching extremal points, i.e. the flows not only move away from the equilibrium
locally, but they move away for a big distance. This kind of global instability result can be applied quite broadly,
as many coordination games have non-pure Nash equilibrium. In the standard coordination game (A,A) where
A = [ 1 00 1 ]., the game has three Nash equilibria, namely ((1, 0), (1, 0)), ((0, 1), (0, 1)) and ((1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2)).
The latest one is a non-pure Nash equilibrium.
Another example is the following generalization. Consider a two-player coordination game where each player
has n strategies. Suppose that when both players choose strategy i, they both earn $Ai, and otherwise they
both lose $Z, where Ai > 0 and Z ≥ 0. Then the game has a non-pure Nash equilibrium (x∗,x∗), where
x∗i =
1
Ai+Z
/(∑
j
1
Aj+Z
)
, which is strictly positive for all i.
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.Figure 3: Evolution of MWU (left) and OMWU (right) in zero-sum (top) and coordination (bottom) games in
the dual space of Eshel and Akin. The initial set is the red square. The top two figures were already shown
and discussed in the first page. The bottom two figures correspond to MWU and OMWU in the coordination
game (A,A), where A is the 2 × 2 identity matrix. The vector fields associated with MWU and OMWU are
very similar, and so does the two figures. However, when we compute how the areas change, we observe that
for MWU, the area is shrinking slowly (from red to blue), while for OMWU, the area is increasing slowly.
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Figure 4: Let x,y denote respectively the mixed strategies of Players 1 and 2 in the classical Rock-Paper-
Scissors game. We plot the quantity
∑3
j=1(xj)
4+
∑3
k=1(yk)
4 against time steps between 1.97×106 to 2.00×106,
when both players employ MWU with step-size ǫ = 0.005, and starting point x0 ∝ (1, 1, exp(1/2)) and y0 ∝
(1, 1, exp(−1/2)). When the red curve is above the blue horizontal line, extremism occurs, i.e., each player
concentrate on one strategy, with some xj , yk ≥ 0.995. Within the 30000 time steps, extremism occurs for 22
periods; each period has length around 350.
A Missing Examples and Proof in Section 2
In Section 2, we pointed out two facts:
(A) volume contraction in the dual space does not necessarily imply stability in either the dual or the primal
space;
(B) volume expansion in the dual space does not necessarily imply instability in the primal space.
To see why (A) is true, consider the following parametrized rectangular set S(z) around the origin in the
dual space:
S(z) := {(p,q) ∈ R2 × R2
∣∣∣ |p1|, |q1| ≤ 1/z, |p2|, |q2| ≤ √z}.
As z increases, the volume of S(z) = 1/z decreases, but its diameter and the quantities max{p2−p1}, max{q2−
q1} are Θ(
√
z) which increase with z. Also, since S contains the points
((0,
√
z), (0,
√
z)), ((0,−√z), (0,−√z)),
when the set S(z) is converted to the primal space, G(S) contains points close to
((0, 1), (0, 1)), ((1, 0), (1, 0))
as z →∞, so the diameter of G(S) increases to 2 as z →∞.
To see why (B) is true, consider the following parametrized set S(z) in the dual space:
S(z) := {(p,q) ∈ R2 × R2
∣∣∣ p2 ≥ p1 + z and q2 ≥ q1 + z, and 0 ≤ p1, p2, q1, q2 ≤ 3z}.
It is not hard to compute its volume 4z4 which increases with z, but its primal counterpart contracts and
converges to a single point ((0, 1), (0, 1)).
We also note that (B) remains true in the dual space used by Eshel and Akin. An example is
S(z) = {((p1 − p3, p2 − p3), (q1 − q3, q2 − q3))
∣∣ z ≤ p1 − p3, q1 − q3 ≤ 2z and − 2z ≤ p2 − p3, q2 − q3 ≤ −z}.
The volume of S(z) is z4 which increases with z, but its primal counterpart converges to the primal point
((1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0)) as z →∞.
Proposition 2 follows directly from the following proposition.
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Proposition 13. Let S be a set in the dual space with Lebesgue volume v. Also, suppose there exists j ∈ S1
and k ∈ S2 such that max(p,q)∈S pj −min(p,q)∈S pj ≤ Rj and max(p,q)∈S qk −min(p,q)∈S qk ≤ Rk. Then for
β := exp
((
v
RjRk
)1/(n+m−2))
, at least one of the followings holds:
• There exists j′ ∈ S1 such that
(
max(p,q)∈S
xj′ (p)
xj(p)
)/(
min(p,q)∈S
xj′ (p)
xj(p)
)
≥ β. Furthermore, if there
exists (p#,q#) ∈ S such that xj(p#), xj′ (p#) ≥ κ > 0, then the diameter of G(S) w.r.t. ℓ2 norm is at
least
(
1− β−1/4)κ.
• There exists k′ ∈ S2 such that
(
max(p,q)∈S
yk′ (q)
yk(q)
)/(
min(p,q)∈S
yk′ (q)
yk(q)
)
≥ β. Furthermore, if there
exists (p#,q#) ∈ S such that yk(q#), yk′ (q#) ≥ κ > 0, then the diameter of G(S) w.r.t. ℓ2 norm is at
least
(
1− β−1/4)κ.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that j = 1 and k = 1. Consider the mapping:
((p1, p2, · · · , pn) , (q1, q2, · · · , qm)) → ((p1, p2 − p1, · · · , pn − p1) , (q1, q2 − q1, · · · , qm − q1)).
This is a linear mapping, and it is easy to verify that the determinant of the matrix that describes this linear
mapping has determinant 1, so the mapping is volume-preserving.
Suppose that each of the quantities pj′ − p1 and qk′ − q1 is bounded by an interval of length at most R
within the set S, for a value of R to be specified later. Then S is a subset of a rectangular box in Rn+m, with
n +m− 2 sides of lengths at most R, and the remaining two sides of lengths at most Rj and Rk. Thus, the
volume of S after the above linear mapping is at most Rn+m−2RjRk. When R < (
v
RjRk
)1/(n+m−2), this is a
contradiction.
Thus, there exists one quantity pj′ − p1 or qk′ − q1 which is not bounded by an interval of length at most
( vRjRk )
1/(n+m−2). Then we are done by recalling that
xj′ (p)
x1(p)
= exp(pj′ − p1) and yk′(q)y1(q) = exp(qk′ − q1).
If furthermore, there exists (p#,q#) ∈ S such that xj(p#), xj′ (p#) ≥ κ > 0, then there exists (p∗,q∗) ∈ S
such that either
xj(p
∗)
xj′ (p∗)
/
xj(p
#)
xj′ (p#)
≥ β1/2 or xj(p
∗)
xj′ (p∗)
/
xj(p
#)
xj′ (p#)
≤ β−1/2.
We focus on the former case, as the latter case is similar. We have xj(p
∗)−xj(p#) ≥ xj(p#)·
(
xj′ (p
∗)
xj′ (p
#)
· β1/2 − 1
)
.
If
xj′ (p
∗)
xj′ (p
#)
≥ β−1/4, we have xj(p∗)− xj(p#) ≥ κ(β1/4 − 1) ≥ κ(1 − β−1/4). Otherwise, xj′ (p
∗)
xj′ (p
#)
< β−1/4, and
hence xj′ (p
#)− xj′ (p∗) > xj′ (p#) ·
(
1− β−1/4) ≥ κ(1− β−1/4).
B Extremism of MWU in Zero-Sum Games
Lemma 14. Suppose an agent has m options which she use MWU with step-size ǫ to decide the mixed strategy
yt = (yt1, · · · , ytm) in each time step. Suppose at each round t, the payoff to each option k is ak + δtk, where
• each ak ∈ [−1, 1];
• there exists a positive number α2 > 0, such that for any 2 ≤ k ≤ m, ak−1 − ak ≥ α2;
• there exists a positive number δ ≤ α2/8, such that δtk ∈ [−2δ, 2δ].
Let kˆ(t) denote the strategy min{k ∈ [m] | ytk > δ/(m − 1)}. Then for T :=
⌈
2
ǫ(α2−4δ)
· ln m−1δ
⌉
, (i) if yτ+T
has more than one entries larger than δ/(m− 1) for some τ ≥ 0, then kˆ(τ + T ) ≤ kˆ(τ) − 1, and (ii) for some
t ≤ (m− 1)T , yt has an entry which is larger than or equal to 1− δ.
Proof. For part (i), we prove the contrapositive statement instead: if kˆ(τ + T ) ≥ kˆ(τ), then yτ+T has exactly
one entry larger than δ/(m− 1).
Let k = kˆ(τ). For any ℓ > k, due to the definition of the MWU update rule (4) and our assumptions, for
t ≥ τ ,
yt+1ℓ
yt+1k
=
ytℓ
ytk
· exp (ǫ(aℓ + δtℓ − ak − δtk)) ≤ ytℓytk · exp (−ǫ(α2 − 4δ)) .
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Since k = kˆ(τ), we have yτk > δ/(m− 1). Also, ytk, yτℓ ≤ 1 trivially. Thus, for any t ≥ τ ,
ytℓ ≤ ytk ·
yτℓ
yτk
· exp (−ǫ(α2 − 4δ)(t− τ)) < m− 1
δ
· exp (−ǫ(α2 − 4δ)(t− τ)) .
When exp (−ǫ(α2 − 4δ)(t− τ)) ≤ δ2/(m − 1)2, or equivalently t ≥ τ +
⌈
2
ǫ(α2−4δ)
· ln m−1δ
⌉
= τ + T , we have
ytℓ ≤ δ/(m− 1).
Due to the conclusion of the last paragraph, we have kˆ(τ + T ) ≤ k. But we also have the assumption
kˆ(τ + T ) ≥ kˆ(τ) = k. Thus, kˆ(τ + T ) = k, and hence for any k′ < k, yτ+Tk′ ≤ δ/(m − 1). This, together with
the conclusion of the last paragraph, shows that yτ+Tk is the only entry in y
τ+T which is larger than δ/(m−1).
This completes the proof of part (i).
We prove part (ii) by contradiction. Suppose that for all t ≤ (m− 1)T , yt has more than one entries larger
than δ/(m− 1). First of all, kˆ(0) 6= m, for otherwise y0m is the only entry in y0 which is larger than δ/(m− 1).
Next, we apply part (i) for (m − 1) times to yield that kˆ((m − 1)T ) ≤ kˆ(0) − (m − 1) ≤ 0, a contradiction.
Thus, for some yt with t ≤ (m− 1)T , it has exactly one entry which is larger than δ/(m− 1). The entry has
to be larger than or equal to 1− (m− 1)(δ/(m− 1)) = 1− δ.
Proof of Theorem 9: The proof comprises of three steps.
Step 1.We show that for any κ > 0, Eκ2,2 is an uncontrollable primal set with inf(x,y)∈Eκ2,2 C(x,y) ≥ κ2(α1)2/2.
Recall Lemma 3 that C(x,y) is the variance of a random variable X , which is equal to E
[
(X − E [X ])2].
For any point (x,y) ∈ Eκ2,2, each of x,y has at least two entries larger than κ. Suppose xj1 , xj2 , yk1 , yk2 > κ.
Then
C(x,y) ≥
∑
j∈{j1,j2}
∑
k∈{k1,k2}
κ2

(Ajk − [Ay]j − [ATx]k)− E [X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
A′
jk


2
. (22)
Due to Condition (A) and Equation (1), we are guaranteed that among the four possible values of A′jk, the
maximum and minimum values differ by at least α1, for otherwise we can choose aj = [Ay]j + E [X ] and
bk = −[ATx]k in (1) to show that the 2× 2 sub-matrix of A corresponding to strategies {j1, j2}× {k1, k2} has
distance from triviality strictly less than α1. Consequently, C(x,y) ≥ κ2(α1/2)2 · 2 = κ2(α1)2/2.
Step 2. Then we apply Theorem 5 to show that for any step-size ǫ < min
{
1
32n2m2 ,
κ2(α1)
2
2
}
, there exists a
dense subset of points in int(∆) such that the flow of each such point must eventually reach a point outside
Eκ2,2. Let (xˆ, yˆ) denote the point outside Eκ2,2. At (xˆ, yˆ), one of the two players, which we assume to be Player
1 without loss of generality, concentrates her game-play on only one strategy, which we denote by strategy jˆ.
Precisely, for any j 6= jˆ, xˆj ≤ κ, and hence
∑
j∈S1\{jˆ}
xˆj ≤ (N − 1)κ.
Step 3. Now, we consider the flow starting from (xˆ, yˆ). Since xt+1j /x
t
j ≤ exp(2ǫ) always, we are sure that
for the next T1 :=
⌊
1
2ǫ ln
δ
(N−1)κ
⌋
time steps,
∑
j∈S1\{jˆ}
xtj ≤ δ. Thus, within this time period, the payoff
to strategy k of Player 2 in each time step is −Ajˆk plus a perturbation term in the interval [−2δ, 2δ]. Then
by Lemma 14 part (ii) (a sanity check on the conditions required by the lemma is easy and thus skipped),
if (N − 1) ·
⌈
2
ǫ(α2−4δ)
· ln N−1δ
⌉
≤ T1, we are done. A direct arithmetic shows that this inequality holds if
κ ≤ (δ/(N − 1))4(N−1)/(α2−4δ)+1/3.
Proof of Theorem 10: By Theorem 9, we are guaranteed that there exists a dense set of starting points
such that the flow of each of them must eventually reach the extremal domain with threshold δ. When we
apply Theorem 9, This is our starting point to prove Theorem 10.
Step 1. We show that: for each such starting point y, we prove that its flow cannot remain in the extremal
domain forever.
First, observe that the extremal domain is the union of small neighbourhoods of extremal points, and each
such neighbourhood is far from the other neighbourhoods.
Suppose the contrary that there exists a starting point such that its flow remains in the extremal domain
forever. Due to the above observation, its flow must remain in the small neighbourhood of one extremal point
forever. Suppose the utility values at this extremal point is (u,−u); recall that by assumption, |u − v| ≥ r.
Since the flow remains near this extremal point, in the long run, the average utility gained by Player 1 must
lie in the interval (1− δ)u± δ, which is a subset of the interval u± 2δ.
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On the other hand, due to a well-known regret bound of MWU (see, for instance, [7, Lemma 9]), in the
long run, the average utility gained by Player 1 must lie in the interval v ± 3ǫ. When 3ǫ + 2δ ≤ r/2, this is
incompatible with the interval derived in the previous paragraph, thus a contradiction.
Step 2. Indeed, we have a stronger version of the result in Step 1. Recall that the complement of the extremal
domain is an open set. Since the MWU update rule is a continuous mapping, it preserves openness, and hence
we not only one point y that visits and leaves the extremal domain, but we have an open neighbourhood O1
around y, such that the flow of O1 visits and leaves the extremal domain. Let O′ denote the flow of O1 at the
moment when the flow leaves the extremal domain. O′ is open, and hence has positive Lebesgue measure.
Then we construct a closed subset C1 ⊂ O1 with positive Lebesgue measure. This is easy as follows. First,
we take an arbitrary point z ∈ O′. Since O′ is open, there exists an open ball around z with some radius r > 0
which is contained in O′. Since the MWU update rule is a continuous mapping, its inverse for arbitrary finite
time preserves closeness, the inverse (back to the starting time) of the closed ball around z with radius r/2 is
a closed set, which we take as C1; C1 ⊂ O1 since the closed ball around z with radius r/2 is a subset of O′, and
the inverse (back to the starting time) of O′ is O1.
Step 3. Since C1 has positive Lebesgue measure, we can reiterate the arguments in Steps 1 and 2, and construct
open set O2 ⊂ C1 and closed set C2 ⊂ O2 that visit and leave the extremal domain again.
By iterating these arguments repeatedly, we get a sequence of closed (and indeed compact) sets C1 ⊃ C2 ⊃
C3 ⊃ · · · . By the Cantor’s intersection theorem, the intersection of this sequence of closed sets must be non-
empty. Then any point in this intersection is a starting point that visits and leaves the extremal domain
infinitely often.
B.1 Classical Rock-Paper-Scissors Game
The standard Rock-Paper-Scissors game is the zero-sum game (A,−A) with the following payoff matrix:
A =
[
0 −1 1
1 0 −1
−1 1 0
]
. There are two types of 2×2 sub-matrices ofA. Consider such a sub-matrix which corresponds
to strategy set Qi ⊂ {R,P, S} for Players i = 1, 2. The first type is when Q1 = Q2, then the sub-matrix is
A′ =
[
0 −1
1 0
]
, which is trivial, i.e., c(A′) = 0. The second type is when |Q1 ∩ Q2| = 1, then the sub-matrix
is A′′ =
[
0 1
1 −1
]
; it is easy to show that c(A′′) = 3/2. Due to the existence of the first type of sub-matrices,
Theorem 9 cannot be applied. We provide a separate proof to show that the same conclusion of Theorem 9
holds for this specific game.
Theorem 15. Suppose the underlying game is the standard Rock-Paper-Scissors game. For any 0 < δ < 1/20,
if both players use MWU with step-size ǫ satisfying ǫ < δ22/(34 × 106), then there exists a dense subset of
points in int(∆), such that the flow of each such point must eventually reach a point (x,y) where each of x,y
has exactly one entry larger than or equal to 1− δ.
Proof. To start, we define a new family of primal set Eκ. To define it, let (x,y) be a point in int(∆), and let
Qi denote the set of strategies of Player 1 with probability density larger than κ. Then (x,y) ∈ Eκ if and only
if |Q1|, |Q2| ≥ 2, and furthermore, there exists Q′1 ⊂ Q1, Q′2 ⊂ Q2 such that |Q′1|, |Q′2| = 2 and |Q′1 ∩Q′2| = 1.
The definition of Eκ deliberately avoids us from deriving a lower bound of C(x,y) in the manner of (22)
when {j1, j2} = {k1, k2}, which corresponds to a trivial sub-matrix. Then by following Step 1 in the proof of
Theorem 9, we have infx,y∈Eκ ≥ κ2c(A′′)2/2 = 9κ2/8. By following Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 9, when
ǫ < min
{
1
32n2m2 ,
9κ2
8
}
, there exists a dense set of points in int(∆) such that the flow of each such point must
reach a point (xˆ, yˆ) outside Eκ.
Below, we assume the time is reset to zero with starting point (xˆ, yˆ). We proceed on a case analysis below.
Case 1: either |Q1| = 1 or |Q2| = 1. For this case, we can simply follow Step 3 in the proof of Theorem 9.
κ ≤ δ11/6144 suffices.
Case 2: Q1 = Q2, and |Q1| = 2. Without loss of generality, we assume Q1 = Q2 = {R,P}. In the sub-game
corresponding to Q1×Q2, each player has a strictly dominant strategy, namely P . Intuitively, the probability
of choosing strategy P must strictly increase with time (when we ignore the tiny effect of strategy S).
More formally, starting from time zero, for the next T1 :=
⌊
1
2ǫ ln
δ
2κ
⌋
time steps, xtS , y
t
S ≤ δ/2, and hence
xtP + x
t
R, y
t
P + y
t
R ≥ 1− δ/2. Then
(the payoff to strategy P of Player 1 in round t)− (the payoff to strategy R of Player 1 in round t)
=
[
ytP · 0 + ytR · 1 + ytS · (−1)
]− [ytP · (−1) + ytR · 0 + ytS · 1]
≥ ytP + ytR − δ ≥ 1− 2δ.
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Thus,
xt+1
P
xt+1
R
≥ xtP
xt
R
· exp (ǫ(1− 2δ)), and hence
xtP
xtR
≥ xˆP · exp (ǫ(1− 2δ)t) . (23)
The above inequality holds also when all x’s are replaced by y’s.
• Case 2(a): at (xˆ, yˆ), each of the two players have one strategy with probability larger than
or equal to 1− δ. Then we are done.
• Case 2(b): at (xˆ, yˆ), each of the two players have all strategies with probability less than
1− δ. Then we know that xˆP , yˆP ≥ 1 − (1 − δ) − δ/2 = δ/2. By (23), when exp (ǫ(1− 2δ)t) ≥ 4/δ2, we
have xtP /x
t
R, y
t
P /y
t
R ≥ 2/δ. And since we still have xtS , ytS ≤ δ/2, it is easy to show that xtP , ytP ≥ 1− δ.
• Case 2(c): at (xˆ, yˆ), exactly one of the two players have one strategy with probability larger
than or equal to 1−δ. Without loss of generality, we assume the player is Player 2. Then we know that
xˆP , xˆR ≥ δ/2. Similar to the argument for Case 2(b), when exp (ǫ(1− 2δ)t) ≥ 4/δ2, we have xtP ≥ 1− δ.
If at this time t, we have either ytP ≥ 1 − δ or ytR ≥ 1 − δ, we are done. Otherwise, we have ytP ≥ δ/2.
Thus, after another period of time t′ such that exp (ǫ(1− 2δ)t′) ≥ 4/δ2, we have yt+t′P ≥ 1 − δ, while
xt+t
′
P ≥ 1− δ still.
For the arguments for Cases 2(b),(c) to hold, we need
2 ·
⌈
1
(1− 2δ)ǫ ln
4
δ2
⌉
≤ T1,
A direct arithmetic shows that κ ≤ δ10/2845 suffices.
C Continuous Analogue of OMWU in General-Sum Games
In equations (18) and (19), observe that each
dpj
dt is expressed as an affine combination of various
dqk
dt , while
each dqk
dt is expressed as an affine combination of various
dpj
dt . Thus, we may rewrite all these expressions into
a matrix-form differential equation. Let v(p,q) denote the following vector in Rn+m:
v(p,q) = ([A · y(q)]1, · · · , [A · y(q)]n , [BT · x(p)]1, · · · , [BT · x(p)]m)T ,
and letM(p,q) denote the (S1∪S2)×(S1∪S2) matrix
[
0 M1
M2 0
]
, whereM1 ≡M1(p,q) is a S1×S2 sub-matrix
and M2 ≡M2(p,q) is a S2 × S1 sub-matrix defined as below:
M1jk = yk(q) · (Ajk − [A · y(q)]j) and M2kj = xj(p) · (Bjk − [BT · x(p)]k).
Then we can rewrite the recurrence system (18) and (19) as
(
dp
dt ,
dq
dt
)T
= v(p,q) + ǫ ·M(p,q) ·
(
dp
dt ,
dq
dt
)T
.
This can be easily solved to a standard (non-recurring) system of ODE:(
dp
dt
,
dq
dt
)T
= (I− ǫ ·M(p,q))−1 · v(p,q),
if the inverse of the matrix (I− ǫ ·M(p,q)) exists.
We proceed by using the following identity: if a square matrix R satisfies sup‖z‖=1 ‖Rz‖ < 1, then (I −
R)−1 = I +
∑∞
ℓ=1R
ℓ. In our case, we desire sup‖z‖=1 ‖ǫ ·M(p,q) · z‖ < 1. Observe that for each row of
M(p,q), its ℓ2-norm is at most 2‖x‖ or 2‖y‖, which are upper bounded by 2. Thus, each entry in ǫ ·M(p,q) ·z
is absolutely bounded by 2ǫ, and hence ‖ǫ ·M(p,q) · z‖ ≤ 2ǫ√n+m. Consequently, ǫ < 1/(2√n+m) suffices
to guarantee that the inverse of (I− ǫ ·M(p,q)) exists, and the identity mentioned above holds for its inverse:
(
dp
dt
,
dq
dt
)T
=
(
I+
∞∑
ℓ=1
ǫℓ ·M(p,q)ℓ
)
· v(p,q).
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D Volume Analysis of Discrete-Time OMWU
Recall from [8] that the volume integrand for MWU is
1 + C(A,B)(p,q) · ǫ2 + O(ǫ4),
while by (21), the volume integrand for OMWU is
1 − C(A,B)(p,q) · ǫ2 + O(ǫ3).
By (14), within G−1(Eδ2,2), C(A,−A)(p,q) ≥ δ2(α1)2/2, thus C(A,A)(p,q) = − C(A,−A)(p,q) ≤ −δ2(α1)2/2.
Therefore, when ǫ is sufficiently small, the volume integrands for MWU in coordination game and OMWU in
zero-sum game are both at most 1− ǫ2δ2(α1)2/4.
Theorem 16. Suppose the underlying game is a non-trivial zero-sum game (A,−A) and the parameter α1
as defined in Theorem 9 is strictly positive. For any 1/2 > δ > 0, for any sufficiently small 0 < ǫ ≤
ǫ¯ where the upper bound depends on δ, and for any set S = S(0) ⊂ G−1(Eδ2,2) in the dual space, if S is
evolved by the OMWU update rule (5) and if its flow remains a subset of G−1(Eδ2,2) for all t ≤ T − 1, then
vol(S(T )) ≤
(
1− ǫ2δ2(α1)24
)T
· vol(S).
Theorem 17. Suppose the underlying game is a non-trivial coordination game (A,A) and the parameter
α1 as defined in Theorem 9 is strictly positive. For any 1/2 > δ > 0, for any sufficiently small 0 < ǫ ≤
ǫ¯ where the upper bound depends on δ, and for any set S = S(0) ⊂ G−1(Eδ2,2) in the dual space, if S is
evolved by the MWU update rule (3) and if its flow remains a subset of G−1(Eδ2,2) for all t ≤ T − 1, then
vol(S(T )) ≤
(
1− ǫ2δ2(α1)24
)T
· vol(S).
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